奇爱博士

HD中字

主演:彼得·塞勒斯,乔治·C·斯科特,斯特林·海登,詹姆斯·厄尔·琼斯,格伦·贝克

类型:电影地区:美国语言:英语年份:1964

 量子

缺集或无法播,更换其他线路.

 无尽

缺集或无法播,更换其他线路.

 优质

缺集或无法播,更换其他线路.

 红牛

缺集或无法播,更换其他线路.

 非凡

缺集或无法播,更换其他线路.

 剧照

奇爱博士 剧照 NO.1奇爱博士 剧照 NO.2奇爱博士 剧照 NO.3奇爱博士 剧照 NO.4奇爱博士 剧照 NO.5奇爱博士 剧照 NO.6奇爱博士 剧照 NO.13奇爱博士 剧照 NO.14奇爱博士 剧照 NO.15奇爱博士 剧照 NO.16奇爱博士 剧照 NO.17奇爱博士 剧照 NO.18奇爱博士 剧照 NO.19奇爱博士 剧照 NO.20

 剧情介绍

奇爱博士电影免费高清在线观看全集。
  美国空军将领杰克•瑞(斯特林·海登 Sterling Hayden 饰)怀疑苏共的“腐朽思想”正在毒害“正直善良”的美国人民,他于是下令携带核弹头的飞行部队前往苏联,对敌人进行毁灭性的核打击。苏联方面得知此事,立即致电美国总统墨尔金•马夫雷(彼得·塞勒斯 Peter Sellers 饰),并威胁如若领土遭到攻击,苏联将不惜一切代价按下“世界末日装置”。该装置的威力足以摧毁地球上所有的生命。  一场有关全人类乃至整个地球命运的战争就这样悄然且荒诞地拉开了序幕……  影片根据彼得•乔治1958年的小说《红色警戒(Red Alert)》改编而成,与《2001漫游太空》、《发条橙》并称为“未来三部曲”。白昼之雨星际旅行:下一代第六季我的行进人生天涯海角(粤语)野玫瑰敢不敢奥特Q黑寡妇(原声版)非常同伙好兆头第二季疯狂爷孙双面女蝎星爱丽丝城市漫游记拆弹专家2(粤语)家和万事兴横冲直撞20岁 第一季云淡风轻风火世代自由之子铁路员工控方证人欠债还钱 (2016)极速前进第三十四季虽然没准备什么菜2刺青1981不要向下看食人族妮娜的一切最强仙界朋友圈·动态漫画美国革命家:陈玉平的演进还有诗和远方第三季笼子里的女人描准魔幻狂迷奔跑吧艾米丽匿名动物灵能百分百II狂野嘻哈梦神探阿蒙第三季柏林情报站第一季无辜者2021致命之吻

 长篇影评

 1 ) 角色姓名的性隐喻伪考

此考并不完全,也不知库布里克是否有此意,如果有,那庆幸鄙人尝试去猜了,如果没有,喂,这也太巧合了吧。

Group Captain Lionel Mandrake
Mandrake在植物上名为风茄,也就是哈利波特中出现的曼德拉草,形状奇特,阿拉伯人称之为“妖魔的蛋”,在希伯来语中意为“爱的植物”,在某些亚洲文化中,人们相信风茄有使妇女受孕的功能,直白点就是春药、怀胎药。此处为男性生殖隐喻。

President Merkin Muffley
Muffed:To screw something up
在粗俗语言中指妓女、阴户,或二椅子。

General ‘Buck’Turgidson
Buck
1.v: slang for the act of fighting
2.v: slang for disagree'ing and feeling angry towards something
3.n: slang for a young black man
4.n: a male deer
5.n: slang for money
指打斗行为、暴力、年轻黑人男性、雄鹿、钱
此词真乃是赤裸裸的雄性特征
Turgidson
Turgid意思为肿胀,son这词儿大家都认识,此姓意为勃起的生殖器。

rigadier General Jack Ripper
Jack Ripper一说,只能联想到Jack the Ripper,大名鼎鼎的开膛手杰克,他于1888年8月7日到11月9日期间,在伦敦东区(East End of London)的白教堂(Whitechapel)一带,以残忍手法连续杀害至少五名妓女的凶手。死者的遗体显示受害者喉咙被割开,死后腹部往往被剖开,部分受害者甚至外阴被凶手切下。

Major 'King' Kong
金刚,雄性特征还用提吗

Russian Ambassador Alexi de Sadesky
Sadesky来源于Sade,和萨德挂钩的除了“性虐待”以外还有什么好词儿么

Dr. Strangelove
对战争、毁灭、破坏、野心、阴谋这些畸形的爱

 2 ) 我是如何学会停止焦虑并爱上炸弹的

《奇爱博士》讲述了一个由理性导致的疯狂是如何将世界毁灭的荒诞喜剧故事。 影片的全名叫做Dr. Strangelove, or How I Learned to Stop Worrying and Love the Bomb 即《奇爱博士,或者我是如何学会停止焦虑并爱上炸弹的》,这就是它的唯一的名,而不是像一般媒体上介绍的“《奇爱博士》又名《我是如何学会停止恐惧并爱上炸弹的》”。之所以在此特别声明,是因为这个名字是一个整体,“奇爱博士”点明了整个电影的灵魂,“我是如何学会停止恐惧并爱上炸弹的”则是对电影内容的完美诠释。 Dr.Strangelove,奇爱博士。奇爱博士奇怪的爱,喜爱战争和破坏。 乍看起来,这可能是对strangelove比较合理的解释。影片中的奇爱博士,仿佛对战争有一种病态的喜爱,当苏联方面透露其足以毁灭世界的装置将要启动时,他显示出难以抑制的兴奋,而当众人以为危机解除而欢呼雀跃时,他又独自一人缩在阴影中,显示出平静的失望,又好像在耐心等待,而最终当世界将确定无误将被毁灭时,他的脸上终于大放异彩,绘声绘色地开始描述起幸存者将在地下进行的核时代生活,他的右手也挣脱了他的掌控,两次不受控制地行起了纳粹礼,而在影片的最后,他竟奇迹般从轮椅上站了起来,高呼:“元首,我可以走了!” 我们似乎可以就此简单地将奇爱博士诠释为潜伏在美国高层伺机待发的纳粹毁灭狂人,但对他的名字,Strangelove,也即影片的名字,却有必要再深究一番,到底这个“爱”指的是什么? 想明白奇爱博士的爱,就要先弄懂,我到底是如何学会停止焦虑并爱上炸弹的? 首先,焦虑从何而来 却说1960年代冷战突然加剧,美苏两国疯狂进行核军备竞赛,而竞赛的核心宗旨就是向对方进行威慑。什么是“威慑”?奇爱博士在影片最后是这么说的:“威慑是一种让敌人在发动进攻时产生内心恐惧感的艺术。”威慑是门艺术,它的目的就是让敌人感到害怕,就是让敌人知道,如果你敢打我,我就进行疯狂的报复,最终结果是大家一起完蛋。 美国政府的威慑方法是在世界各地都有装载核武器的飞机昼夜飞行,它们装载的核打击力量足以使苏联彻底瘫痪以达到报复的目的。而苏联为了省钱,干脆建立了一套足以毁灭世界的装置,只要苏联遭到核攻击,装置就自动启动,整个地球上的生物都一起完蛋。 但威慑这门艺术有一个终极大BUG,它只在战争开始前有防止战争发生的作用,如果战争真的发生,整套报复机制都毫无意义,大家都死光光了,谁又是得利者呢?但想要使威慑能起作用,就又不得不保证整套报复机制能顺利发挥功效,这样才能威慑到敌人,所以苏联才将其完全交给机器来控制。这是一个逻辑怪圈,最终能推出的就是由理性导致的疯狂。 本片上映于1964年,而在十年后,即1974年,苏联启动了Perimeter计划,建立了一个后来被称为末日系统的预警系统,其目的是在北约核突袭中,当政府决策层和军队高级指挥层均被消灭、国家已失去大脑的情况下,仍具备启动核反击的能力。当系统做出反击的判断时,将由控制室内一名值班人员启动核反击。此时,这名值班人员将是毁灭的最后一道屏障,如果他按下启动反击的按钮,北美大陆在半个小时后将成为生命的地狱,随之而来的核冬天将是整个人类的末日。那一时刻,全人类的命运都掌握在这名小小的值班员手中。 整个冷战时期,每个人的头顶上都悬着一把达摩克利斯之剑。 不得不佩服库布里克的远见卓识,怪不得美国国际安全及军情分析大腕约翰•派克曾说,“关于核战略的所有东西,都可以从《奇爱博士》学到。”该片也成为大学国际政治与核战略研究的教科书内容。 该片虽然直接表达的是对这个冷战的焦虑和批判,但其最终是要揭露战争的荒诞性。美国某空军基地司令就因为自己性功能失常而怀疑这是苏联某个阴谋的结果而发动对苏联的核打击;美国总统谨慎地给苏联总理打电话来解释这是一场误会,而对方却是在妓院里接的电话,而且还喝醉了,于是一国总统与一国总理之间的对话成了百姓间的唠家常,甚至比春晚的相声还有趣;司令的副官好不容易破解了与飞机联络的密码却因为身上没钱而打不起给总统的电话,最后不得不从自动贩卖机里偷钱,期间还被人威胁“如果你找不到总统,我将把你交给可口可乐公司制裁”;装有核弹的飞机历尽千难万险,终于不辱使命完成了任务,所有人都以为自己将得到嘉奖,却不知已成了人类的罪人;机长亢奋地骑着核弹落向目标时,他的西部牛仔精神终于得以表现,那一刻,世界毁灭之幕由他拉开,而他却觉得自己是个英雄…… 克利门楚说:“战争太重要,不能将它交给将军们。”影片中的司令说:“战争太重要,不能将它交给政客们。”而库布里克想说的是“战争太重要,不能将它交给人类。” 下面可以具体得谈谈焦虑了。(警告:以下内容涉及成人内容,敏感读者请绕行) 几乎所有观众稍加联想,就会发现片中几乎无处不在的性暗示,例如片初的两飞机加油时的拍摄角度和柔意绵绵的配乐歌曲《请再温柔一些》,还有机长胯下的核弹,是个明白无误的勃起象征,而且对本片稍加搜索,就会发现片中每个人的名字都赤裸裸地指向某个名词,还有很多其他细节,能否发现就看各自的联系水平了。 那么,现在有两种可能,一,库布里克是个变态的色情狂,二,这些性暗示都有所指。我选二。 冷战带给当时人们的焦虑是我们现在所想象不到的,(即使当时的中国人也感受不到,因为国内实行消息封锁,所有人都异常乐观地为实现共产主义而奋斗)库布里克将这种焦虑投射到了性上来,并借司令之口表达了出来“巨大的疲惫感,随之是空无的感觉”“女人们一直追逐生命之髓,女人们靠近我,我不会躲开她们,但我拒绝给她们生命之髓”可以想见,司令一直憋着自己的欲望和“精髓”,长期的肿胀难忍使他产生了深深的焦虑,这与冷战中的美国是何其相似。终于,他释放了自己的焦虑,发出了攻击指令,嘴里的雪茄(联想)高高的崛起。好色的将军在作战室里接到秘书兼情人充满爱意的电话时,也是一脸的焦虑,他不住的解释“我很想,宝贝,但我现在不能。”而那个骑着炸弹的机长,他是多么的亢奋,多么的欢快,他右手挥舞着牛仔帽,左手紧紧抓住胯下的炸弹,脸上的神情仿佛在骄傲地呐喊:“我勃起了!我摆脱了压抑,我终于勃起了!看,这么大!”而最后当奇爱博士兴奋而严谨地描述在地下避难的生活状态时,指出男女比例应该定位1:10,所有人的脸上都大放异彩,而将军的眼神更是表达了这种渴望,仿佛每个人都在说“上帝啊,我们期盼的就是这个。” 于是,整部影片就有了一个性压抑——性释放的变化过程,这种变化是奇爱博士带来的,他为性功能障碍的人带来了正常或者说是疯狂的性爱,为处于焦虑中的人们带来了终极解脱——爱上炸弹,让战争爆发,就再也没有焦虑了。 这就是奇爱博士带来的爱,给全人类的爱,奇怪而又理性的爱。 这就是奇爱的含义,影片到了这里,终于露出喜剧表面下的鬼魅与惊悚来了。 一些杂七杂八 《奇爱博士》是一部荒诞喜剧片,它最大的特色在于影片中没有任何一个角色是荒诞的,也没有任何一个人是用来表现喜剧的,每一个演员的表演都有板有眼,毫无做作搞怪之感。影片中的荒诞,完全是出自人类自身的荒诞。而这种喜剧,才叫做喜剧,现在香港经常拍的那种不叫喜剧,而叫闹剧,玩得还是星爷上个世纪玩剩下的。 关于奇爱博士不听话的右手,这种症状并不是导演为了刻意表现什么而捏造出来的症状,这种病例叫做异手症,有兴趣的可以自己百度。 今天是情人节,笔者却写了一个1964年老片的影评,貌似有些不合时宜,我只能说,这是个巧合。但其中大谈的成人内容,是为节日扫兴了还是助兴了,就不管笔者的事了。 相信我,我只是个善良的光棍。 --------------------------------------------------------------------- ps:本文部分内容参考了西夏大神的影评,还有刘慈欣《三体三》的相关内容,在此不特别标明,看过的很容易就能发现,没看过的也不会特意去找。

 3 ) 《奇爱博士》:或者我们如何克服对黑白片的恐惧,并热爱库布里克

恐惧(panic)在希腊人那里原本只是一个人在林中漫步时突然袭来的畏惧感,他们用一位神祈来为这种感觉命名:潘(Pan);到了中世纪,人们的恐惧集中在吸血鬼、狼人这些幻想的产物和麻风病、黑死病等真实的灾祸上,当然,恐惧有时候也是神学上的,比如各类心怀鬼胎者对天罚日和末日审判的恐惧;近代工业的发展逐渐滋长了城市的堕落和阶级的矛盾,人们的恐惧对象主要成了开膛手杰克这样的变态杀人狂和法国大革命中肆无忌惮的革命屠杀。二十世纪的恐惧是什么?有人说是纳粹集中营。但对大多数没有进过集中营的人来说,那里的苦难是遥远而陌生的,只是读完安妮•弗兰克的某页日记时的瞬间想象,而曾被关在集中营的人尽管为数众多,但他们中大多数都已经死去。对于今天再次在资本主义丰裕的物质文明中安逸度日的人来说,核弹同样是遥远而陌生的,人们只是在看国际新闻时,在某超级大国对某邪恶国家的制裁报道中,偶尔听到这个词。但对经历过冷战的那代人来说,从广岛的“小男孩”和长崎的“胖子”一直到苏联解体,核的梦魇整整围绕了长达半个世纪,可谓二十世纪最主要的恐惧。
斯坦利•库布里克导演的《奇爱博士》就是关于这种恐惧及其后果的。冷战中的苏联和美国都担心对方率先使用核武器,于是各自设计了相应的报复措施。美国的R计划:只要苏联的导弹攻击了华盛顿,美国的中层将领就有权力绕开总统的命令直接启动R计划,几十架部署在美国本土以外的轰炸机将满载着核弹去摧毁苏联的主要军事目标。苏联的世界末日装置:只要美国率先使用核武器,这个由计算机控制的自动装置就会启动,其威力将摧毁地球上的所有生物。美国空军将领杰克•瑞朋从苏联人只喝伏特加推知地球上所有的水都已经被“氟化”了,自己宝贵的“体液”正在被毒化,于是决定率先采取措施:他在苏联没有入侵的情况下直接启动了R计划,同时打电话给美国总统要他全面发动战争,因为召回轰炸机的密码只有他知道,而他已经把他的基地封锁了起来……
核弹的发明使战争变得至为简单:它只是两个超级大国首脑之间的博弈游戏。唯一有制约性的力量只是某种脆弱的人道主义。使人们恐惧的是:谁能保证这种人道主义永远有效,谁能保证不会出现杰克•瑞朋这样的妄想狂。而杰克尽管一半是偏执狂和疯子,但他的行为又何尝不是出于某种恐惧。对核的恐惧与古典时代的恐惧十分不同的是:它不再是某种幻想或者来源于某种自然力和不可控的非理性因素,它本身就是理性科技的产物,同时又反过来作用于理性思维。人们试图用理性的思维去控制作为科技理性产物的恐惧,比如让核弹的力量控制在某个由计算机控制的装置手里,这种思维却反过来被恐惧所俘虏,恐惧成了这种思维。弥漫在冷战意识中的正是这种恐惧思维,恐惧成了某种本体化得东西,到头来唯一使人感到恐惧的其实是这种恐惧本身。
《奇爱博士》集中表现的不是对核弹的个体心理恐惧,而是被恐惧所俘虏的理性化思维本身。该片的空间主要集中在三个地方:军事基地内杰克•瑞朋的办公室,总统的作战指挥室和轰炸机内部。决定地球和人类命运的不再是广阔的战场,而是这三个内部空间,命令的发布与传递是无形的。人类的和平仰赖这三个地方的合理化运转,只要某个环节被非理性的恐惧心理所俘虏,就会带来毁灭性的后果。影片不厌其烦地叙述了R计划从发布到执行的所有细节:杰克•瑞朋广播通知基地士兵苏联已经入侵,他已启动R计划对苏联展开报复性攻击,所有士兵上缴所有通讯设备并严守自己岗位准备作战:敌人有可能在任何时刻穿着任何衣服向基地进攻。这些命令都是军事集团内部完全理性化的作战反应,除了它们的前提是出于一个人非理性的幻想。轰炸机内部,从接到命令到最后的执行的过程都由摄影机巨细靡遗地再现出来:接受命令、向基地取得确认、取出R计划的函件、计划的具体内容、任务的分配、战后飞行员个人生存物资清单的罗列、切断对外信号的措施、锁定通讯频率的措施、飞行高度的数据、里程的数据、投弹后逃生线路的计算……执行R计划需要按动轰炸机内无数的按钮,每发布一条具体的命令,就需要按动一个按钮,摄影机就会给这个动作一个特写给与强调,人类的命运就决定在这些按钮上。所有那些命令的具体实施程序及所有那些按钮都是事前经过完全理性化地运算和设计的,它们的运作几乎是万无一失的,与核弹一样,它们是人类理性的精巧结果,但是当某个源头被非理性的恐惧心理所俘虏,恐惧便随着这条理性的锁链一步步传递并增值,最后产生的完全是非理性的毁灭后果,于是,人们反过来对这条精巧的理性锁链产生巨大的非理性的恐惧。
杰克•瑞朋并非完全是一个妄想狂,他还是一个被彻头彻尾地具有冷战思维的人,这从他一边发布执行R计划的命令一边打电话给总统要求发动全面战争可以看出。冷战思维是一种以恐惧为起点的完全理性化的思维。除了这位杰克,电影中还有一个人物是它的主要代表:巴克将军(影射美国著名的“热爱”战争的巴顿将军)。他在获知杰克已经启动R计划的消息后先是故意拖延时间不向总统汇报,后来又极力鼓动总动发布全面战争。最后当得知苏联的世界末日装置将会启动,人类面临毁灭的命运,美国总统和他的政府要员们商量如何挑选一部分人进入地下矿洞以繁衍人类后代时,他的建议是:如果苏联人偷偷带了一枚炸弹进入矿洞,九十年后人们从矿洞出来,苏联的科技将会领先美国。在这个疯狂的带着小丑色彩的人物身上,以恐惧为起点的思维逻辑被推演到极点,同时恐惧也带上了一层丛林法则的色彩:人们恐惧的只是在强力的较量中处于弱势。
《奇爱博士》一片的全名是《奇爱博士:或者我们如何克服对炸弹的恐惧,并热爱核弹》,听起来像是一本指导手册。片中的奇爱博士是个夸张的漫画般的人物,他对科技的力量怀着一种 “奇怪”的爱,正是他这样的人设计了像“世界末日装置”这类东西。他的原型是科幻小说中疯狂的科学家,库布里克更新了这一类型人物,使他与爱欲结合在一起。奇爱博士在为总统讲解“世界末日装置”的建造原理和核弹爆炸后逃生的方法时眼神中带着疯狂的神采,他似乎根本不在乎几十亿人的生死,他唯一所爱的只是他的“装置”和科技力量本身。讽刺的是,这个科技的骄子本身半身不遂地瘫痪在轮椅上,讲到兴奋处,他的一只手便不受控制般地直冲冲伸向半空中,其姿势颇像“希特勒举手礼”。库布里克似乎想借此讽刺纳粹极权主义的产生在科技的理性化中的根源。“热爱核弹”,正如片名所示,本身就是一种“奇怪的爱”,库布里克想回答的是,爱欲能否改变科技的非理性力量,或者说爱欲能否使人克服对科技的非理性恐惧。《奇爱博士》发行的1964年正是马尔库塞的《爱欲与文明》发表十余年后,以性解放和反战为标志的68年革命运动前夕,人们普遍迷信文明压抑了人的自然欲望,性欲的解放可以使人类从科技与制度的束缚中解放出来。库布里克以这部电影表达了他对这种思潮的看法:在非理性的恐惧面前,即使是爱欲也有可能被导向畸形,人们可以爱男人、爱女人,但也有可能爱核弹。人们突然之间只看到了性的自然健康的一面,却遗忘了性的扭曲的黑暗的一面,畸形的性欲的无法满足要求各种非理性的“代偿”。实际上,《奇爱博士》一片中许多戏剧性的场面和形象都来自于一种无法满足的“奇怪的爱”。除了奇爱博士这一形象,还有比如影片开始时被评论家成为“史上最性感画面”的两架军用飞机加油的镜头。“巴克”将军出场时,他性感的女秘书正穿着“三点式”泳衣晒日光浴,后来将军与总统开会时,这位秘书还打来电话撒娇,无疑,这位热衷于战争的将军同样也热衷于做爱。美国总统在跟苏联总理德米特里打电话时,那位总理显然也在寻欢作乐,显然,性爱有时不过用来缓解军备竞赛带来的焦虑。那位启动R计划的杰克•瑞朋在被问到什么时候第一次想到地球上的水都已经被“氟化”,他的“体液”正被毒害时,他答道,“与女人做爱时”——性的无能需要战争来补偿。
战争无疑导致恐惧,而人们也时常因为恐惧而发动战争。二十世纪的恐惧是对核战争的恐惧,同时也是对被非理性的恐惧所抓住的理性化的科技的恐惧,在后面那种恐惧面前,爱欲也好,理性的科技也好,似乎都无能为力,文明变得岌岌可危。《奇爱博士》最后著名的核弹爆炸的蒙太奇,就像哀婉的预言一样,笼罩在人类文明的上空久不散去。

————————————————

个人公众号:加书亚在路上
正在更新印度旅行日记,欢迎关注!

 4 ) 【转】Almost Everything on "Dr. Strangelove" Was True

(PUBLISHED IN THE NEW YORKER, BY ERIC SCHLOSSER, ON JANUARY 23, 2014)

This month marks the fiftieth anniversary of Stanley Kubrick’s black comedy about nuclear weapons, “Dr. Strangelove or: How I Learned to Stop Worrying and Love the Bomb.” Released on January 29, 1964, the film caused a good deal of controversy. Its plot suggested that a mentally deranged American general could order a nuclear attack on the Soviet Union, without consulting the President. One reviewer described the film as “dangerous … an evil thing about an evil thing.” Another compared it to Soviet propaganda. Although “Strangelove” was clearly a farce, with the comedian Peter Sellers playing three roles, it was criticized for being implausible. An expert at the Institute for Strategic Studies called the events in the film “impossible on a dozen counts.” A former Deputy Secretary of Defense dismissed the idea that someone could authorize the use of a nuclear weapon without the President’s approval: “Nothing, in fact, could be further from the truth.” (See a compendium of clips from the film.) When “Fail-Safe”—a Hollywood thriller with a similar plot, directed by Sidney Lumet—opened, later that year, it was criticized in much the same way. “The incidents in ‘Fail-Safe’ are deliberate lies!” General Curtis LeMay, the Air Force chief of staff, said. “Nothing like that could happen.” The first casualty of every war is the truth—and the Cold War was no exception to that dictum. Half a century after Kubrick’s mad general, Jack D. Ripper, launched a nuclear strike on the Soviets to defend the purity of “our precious bodily fluids” from Communist subversion, we now know that American officers did indeed have the ability to start a Third World War on their own. And despite the introduction of rigorous safeguards in the years since then, the risk of an accidental or unauthorized nuclear detonation hasn’t been completely eliminated.

The command and control of nuclear weapons has long been plagued by an “always/never” dilemma. The administrative and technological systems that are necessary to insure that nuclear weapons are always available for use in wartime may be quite different from those necessary to guarantee that such weapons can never be used, without proper authorization, in peacetime. During the nineteen-fifties and sixties, the “always” in American war planning was given far greater precedence than the “never.” Through two terms in office, beginning in 1953, President Dwight D. Eisenhower struggled with this dilemma. He wanted to retain Presidential control of nuclear weapons while defending America and its allies from attack. But, in a crisis, those two goals might prove contradictory, raising all sorts of difficult questions. What if Soviet bombers were en route to the United States but the President somehow couldn’t be reached? What if Soviet tanks were rolling into West Germany but a communications breakdown prevented NATO officers from contacting the White House? What if the President were killed during a surprise attack on Washington, D.C., along with the rest of the nation’s civilian leadership? Who would order a nuclear retaliation then?

With great reluctance, Eisenhower agreed to let American officers use their nuclear weapons, in an emergency, if there were no time or no means to contact the President. Air Force pilots were allowed to fire their nuclear anti-aircraft rockets to shoot down Soviet bombers heading toward the United States. And about half a dozen high-level American commanders were allowed to use far more powerful nuclear weapons, without contacting the White House first, when their forces were under attack and “the urgency of time and circumstances clearly does not permit a specific decision by the President, or other person empowered to act in his stead.” Eisenhower worried that providing that sort of authorization in advance could make it possible for someone to do “something foolish down the chain of command” and start an all-out nuclear war. But the alternative—allowing an attack on the United States to go unanswered or NATO forces to be overrun—seemed a lot worse. Aware that his decision might create public unease about who really controlled America’s nuclear arsenal, Eisenhower insisted that his delegation of Presidential authority be kept secret. At a meeting with the Joint Chiefs of Staff, he confessed to being “very fearful of having written papers on this matter.”

President John F. Kennedy was surprised to learn, just a few weeks after taking office, about this secret delegation of power. “A subordinate commander faced with a substantial military action,” Kennedy was told in a top-secret memo, “could start the thermonuclear holocaust on his own initiative if he could not reach you.” Kennedy and his national-security advisers were shocked not only by the wide latitude given to American officers but also by the loose custody of the roughly three thousand American nuclear weapons stored in Europe. Few of the weapons had locks on them. Anyone who got hold of them could detonate them. And there was little to prevent NATO officers from Turkey, Holland, Italy, Great Britain, and Germany from using them without the approval of the United States.

In December, 1960, fifteen members of Congress serving on the Joint Committee on Atomic Energy had toured NATO bases to investigate how American nuclear weapons were being deployed. They found that the weapons—some of them about a hundred times more powerful than the bomb that destroyed Hiroshima—were routinely guarded, transported, and handled by foreign military personnel. American control of the weapons was practically nonexistent. Harold Agnew, a Los Alamos physicist who accompanied the group, was especially concerned to see German pilots sitting in German planes that were decorated with Iron Crosses—and carrying American atomic bombs. Agnew, in his own words, “nearly wet his pants” when he realized that a lone American sentry with a rifle was all that prevented someone from taking off in one of those planes and bombing the Soviet Union.

* * *
The Kennedy Administration soon decided to put locking devices inside NATO’s nuclear weapons. The coded electromechanical switches, known as “permissive action links” (PALs), would be placed on the arming lines. The weapons would be inoperable without the proper code—and that code would be shared with NATO allies only when the White House was prepared to fight the Soviets. The American military didn’t like the idea of these coded switches, fearing that mechanical devices installed to improve weapon safety would diminish weapon reliability. A top-secret State Department memo summarized the view of the Joint Chiefs of Staff in 1961: “all is well with the atomic stockpile program and there is no need for any changes.”

After a crash program to develop the new control technology, during the mid-nineteen-sixties, permissive action links were finally placed inside most of the nuclear weapons deployed by NATO forces. But Kennedy’s directive applied only to the NATO arsenal. For years, the Air Force and the Navy blocked attempts to add coded switches to the weapons solely in their custody. During a national emergency, they argued, the consequences of not receiving the proper code from the White House might be disastrous. And locked weapons might play into the hands of Communist saboteurs. “The very existence of the lock capability,” a top Air Force general claimed, “would create a fail-disable potential for knowledgeable agents to ‘dud’ the entire Minuteman [missile] force.” The Joint Chiefs thought that strict military discipline was the best safeguard against an unauthorized nuclear strike. A two-man rule was instituted to make it more difficult for someone to use a nuclear weapon without permission. And a new screening program, the Human Reliability Program, was created to stop people with emotional, psychological, and substance-abuse problems from gaining access to nuclear weapons.

Despite public assurances that everything was fully under control, in the winter of 1964, while “Dr. Strangelove” was playing in theatres and being condemned as Soviet propaganda, there was nothing to prevent an American bomber crew or missile launch crew from using their weapons against the Soviets. Kubrick had researched the subject for years, consulted experts, and worked closely with a former R.A.F. pilot, Peter George, on the screenplay of the film. George’s novel about the risk of accidental nuclear war, “Red Alert,” was the source for most of “Strangelove” ’s plot. Unbeknownst to both Kubrick and George, a top official at the Department of Defense had already sent a copy of “Red Alert” to every member of the Pentagon’s Scientific Advisory Committee for Ballistic Missiles. At the Pentagon, the book was taken seriously as a cautionary tale about what might go wrong. Even Secretary of Defense Robert S. McNamara privately worried that an accident, a mistake, or a rogue American officer could start a nuclear war.

Coded switches to prevent the unauthorized use of nuclear weapons were finally added to the control systems of American missiles and bombers in the early nineteen-seventies. The Air Force was not pleased, and considered the new security measures to be an insult, a lack of confidence in its personnel. Although the Air Force now denies this claim, according to more than one source I contacted, the code necessary to launch a missile was set to be the same at every Minuteman site: 00000000.

* * *
The early permissive action links were rudimentary. Placed in NATO weapons during the nineteen-sixties and known as Category A PALs, the switches relied on a split four-digit code, with ten thousand possible combinations. If the United States went to war, two people would be necessary to unlock a nuclear weapon, each of them provided with half the code. Category A PALs were useful mainly to delay unauthorized use, to buy time after a weapon had been taken or to thwart an individual psychotic hoping to cause a large explosion. A skilled technician could open a stolen weapon and unlock it within a few hours. Today’s Category D PALs, installed in the Air Force’s hydrogen bombs, are more sophisticated. They require a six-digit code, with a million possible combinations, and have a limited-try feature that disables a weapon when the wrong code is repeatedly entered.

The Air Force’s land-based Minuteman III missiles and the Navy’s submarine-based Trident II missiles now require an eight-digit code—which is no longer 00000000—in order to be launched. The Minuteman crews receive the code via underground cables or an aboveground radio antenna. Sending the launch code to submarines deep underwater presents a greater challenge. Trident submarines contain two safes. One holds the keys necessary to launch a missile; the other holds the combination to the safe with the keys; and the combination to the safe holding the combination must be transmitted to the sub by very-low-frequency or extremely-low-frequency radio. In a pinch, if Washington, D.C., has been destroyed and the launch code doesn’t arrive, the sub’s crew can open the safes with a blowtorch.

The security measures now used to control America’s nuclear weapons are a vast improvement over those of 1964. But, like all human endeavors, they are inherently flawed. The Department of Defense’s Personnel Reliability Program is supposed to keep people with serious emotional or psychological issues away from nuclear weapons—and yet two of the nation’s top nuclear commanders were recently removed from their posts. Neither appears to be the sort of calm, stable person you want with a finger on the button. In fact, their misbehavior seems straight out of “Strangelove.”

Vice Admiral Tim Giardina, the second-highest-ranking officer at the U.S. Strategic Command—the organization responsible for all of America’s nuclear forces—-was investigated last summer for allegedly using counterfeit gambling chips at the Horseshoe Casino in Council Bluffs, Iowa. According to the Iowa Division of Criminal Investigation, “a significant monetary amount” of counterfeit chips was involved. Giardina was relieved of his command on October 3, 2013. A few days later, Major General Michael Carey, the Air Force commander in charge of America’s intercontinental ballistic missiles, was fired for conduct “unbecoming an officer and a gentleman.” According to a report by the Inspector General of the Air Force, Carey had consumed too much alcohol during an official trip to Russia, behaved rudely toward Russian officers, spent time with “suspect” young foreign women in Moscow, loudly discussed sensitive information in a public hotel lounge there, and drunkenly pleaded to get onstage and sing with a Beatles cover band at La Cantina, a Mexican restaurant near Red Square. Despite his requests, the band wouldn’t let Carey onstage to sing or to play the guitar.

While drinking beer in the executive lounge at Moscow’s Marriott Aurora during that visit, General Carey made an admission with serious public-policy implications. He off-handedly told a delegation of U.S. national-security officials that his missile-launch officers have the “worst morale in the Air Force.” Recent events suggest that may be true. In the spring of 2013, nineteen launch officers at Minot Air Force base in North Dakota were decertified for violating safety rules and poor discipline. In August, 2013, the entire missile wing at Malmstrom Air Force base in Montana failed its safety inspection. Last week, the Air Force revealed that thirty-four launch officers at Malmstrom had been decertified for cheating on proficiency exams—and that at least three launch officers are being investigated for illegal drug use. The findings of a report by the RAND Corporation, leaked to the A.P., were equally disturbing. The study found that the rates of spousal abuse and court martials among Air Force personnel with nuclear responsibilities are much higher than those among people with other jobs in the Air Force. “We don’t care if things go properly,” a launch officer told RAND. “We just don’t want to get in trouble.”

The most unlikely and absurd plot element in “Strangelove” is the existence of a Soviet “Doomsday Machine.” The device would trigger itself, automatically, if the Soviet Union were attacked with nuclear weapons. It was meant to be the ultimate deterrent, a threat to destroy the world in order to prevent an American nuclear strike. But the failure of the Soviets to tell the United States about the contraption defeats its purpose and, at the end of the film, inadvertently causes a nuclear Armageddon. “The whole point of the Doomsday Machine is lost,” Dr. Strangelove, the President’s science adviser, explains to the Soviet Ambassador, “if you keep it a secret!”

A decade after the release of “Strangelove,” the Soviet Union began work on the Perimeter system—-a network of sensors and computers that could allow junior military officials to launch missiles without oversight from the Soviet leadership. Perhaps nobody at the Kremlin had seen the film. Completed in 1985, the system was known as the Dead Hand. Once it was activated, Perimeter would order the launch of long-range missiles at the United States if it detected nuclear detonations on Soviet soil and Soviet leaders couldn’t be reached. Like the Doomsday Machine in “Strangelove,” Perimeter was kept secret from the United States; its existence was not revealed until years after the Cold War ended.

In retrospect, Kubrick’s black comedy provided a far more accurate description of the dangers inherent in nuclear command-and-control systems than the ones that the American people got from the White House, the Pentagon, and the mainstream media.

“This is absolute madness, Ambassador,” President Merkin Muffley says in the film, after being told about the Soviets’ automated retaliatory system. “Why should you build such a thing?” Fifty years later, that question remains unanswered, and “Strangelove” seems all the more brilliant, bleak, and terrifyingly on the mark.



___________________________________


AND THIS IS REALLY COOL:
Top secret documents released by the Pentagon:
http://www.newyorker.com/online/blogs/newsdesk/2014/01/primary-sources-permissive-action-links-and-the-threat-of-nuclear-war.html

 5 ) 库布里克的黑色幽默:没人敢如此戏弄战争

库布里克,很善于玩转黑色幽默。

电影《光荣之路》中,法国陆军将军下达了一个士兵们根本无法完成的任务,当任务失败,士兵撤退时,这位将军痛下黑手,准备让没有吃到德国枪子儿的士兵,尝尝法国的枪子儿。

《全金属外壳》里,士兵小丑头上写着“天生杀手”,胸前别着“和平印章”的行为艺术装扮,是库布里克对美国越战赤裸而无情的讽刺。

这两部电影中,处处可见黑色幽默。而真正让库布里克成为黑色幽默大师的,是《奇爱博士》。

这部被称为库布里克“未来三部曲”之一的电影,表达了库布里克对人类未来的基本看法:人类的未来就是没有未来 。

1964年,电影上映,冷战还未结束,库布里克送去了一份礼物,在此之前还从未有人敢如此戏弄战争。

一、

美苏两大阵营冷战时期,美国空军基地的一位空军将军突然下达命令,启动R计划,34架携带数千万吨核弹的飞机进攻苏联。(相当于整个二战期间核弹量的11倍)

这意味将爆发一场核战争。

这位瑞皮将军,是私自下达命令的,并切断了和华盛顿总部的一切通讯设备,事前他没有报告他的上级图吉德森将军,更没有经过总统的签字。

他疯了吗?为什么这么做呢。

原来这位看着强悍高大,嘴里喜欢叼着雪茄的将军,性生活有问题,所以他不能征服女人,就要用炮弹征服世界,推行极端的种族主义。

他这一点倒是很像那位发动第二次世界大战的元首希特勒,

于是乎,瑞皮将军因为自己的隐疾,把冷战变成热战,第三次世界大战一触即发。

二、

得知这一消息的图吉德森将军,并没有显示出生气和惊讶,因为此时他还在跟他的女秘书打情骂俏。

等他在作战室平淡的把这一信息告诉总统梅尔金时,总统慌了。而他依然像个没事人一样若无其事,甚至还接到女秘书打来的一通抱怨电话,在核武器准备进攻苏联的时候,他还在安抚女友的情绪,许诺将来一定将她扶正。

同时,也可以看出,图吉德森将军是一个好战分子。对于阻止这一行动,他向总统表示无计可施。对于先发制人,进攻苏联,他倒是激情四射。

三、

当梅尔金总统电话告知苏联总理时,这位总理喝的醉醺醺的,像个女人一样喋喋不休的闹情绪。

此时,苏联大使透漏一个惊天秘闻:只要苏联遭到进攻,会立即启动“世界末日机器”,可以毁灭地球上所有生物和人类。

作为美国战略顾问的奇爱博士,这种机器是电脑程序设定好的,一旦有人想关闭它,它就会自动爆炸。

这位奇爱博士本来就是德国人,曾经为纳粹服务,二战后移民美国。虽然改名换姓,依然遏制不住心中的法西斯情节,身残志坚的致力于摧毁这个世界。

核弹在苏联基地爆炸后,奇爱博士提出了一项“人类精英计划“:从数十亿人口选中几十万人藏于深埋地下的矿井中,等到百年后,核污染散去,才重返陆上。

这位坐着轮椅的奇爱博士,每次说到激动点的时候,他总会脱口而出,大喊“我的元首”。更为滑稽的是,他的右臂会不受控制的自动行“纳粹礼”。

当奇爱博士提到“人类精英计划”中的男女比例是1:10时,在场的男士们沸腾了,因为这将意味着人类将取消“一夫一妻制”,连苏联大使都称赞这是好主意。而最兴奋的莫过于图吉德森将军,他听的两眼发光,也许他和女秘书之间的秘密情史终于可以正大光明的进行了。

四、

一场毁灭人类的核武器大战爆发,而并没有人真正关心。

整个统治世界的男人们,不是吃着口香糖想女人,就是想着如何尽快行动,如何尽快占领地下矿井,好在下一轮的两大阵营的对立面中占据优势。

最后,奇爱博士,再次想出一个绝妙计划的时候,残疾的双腿竟然奇迹般的站起来了,这是是一个巨大的隐喻:意味着纳粹重生。

其实奇爱博士、瑞皮将军、图吉德森将军,他们是三位一体的,他们是战争的设计者、发起者、受益者。世界是他们的,而游戏规则从未变过。

撕下文明的外衣,库布里克表示,人类的未来就是没有未来。

喜欢,请关注 “时空记1994” ,不定期更新影评、书评、乐评。

 6 ) 世界的毁灭与重建——在阳痿与性饥渴之间

让我来把这部电影讲一遍:
从前,有个男人阳痿了,他不肯承认是自己出了问题,然后觉得这个世界上的水有问题。再觉得所有世界上的女人都有毛病,如果不是你们的性需求,就不会有男人的阳痿。因为精子也是水,所以两个问题联系了起来~他觉得水是因为苏联人故意使坏,于是他去毁灭所有的水、毁灭苏联、毁灭世界。
从前,还有一个残疾男人,从来没有女人喜欢他,于是他一直做梦可以有取之不尽用之不竭的女人,每天除了sex什么也不做。然后世界毁灭了,他很高兴,这样就可以名正言顺躲在煤矿里为了人类的繁殖每天只fuck了~然后他的残疾竟然因此神奇地治愈了~



 短评

当年此片竟然全面败给窈窕淑女,奥斯卡这哪是中庸保守,根本就是脑残。

7分钟前
  • 37°2
  • 力荐

黑色战争片,战争与男人,战争与性,导演描述得太隐晦太有魅力了。最后昆少将骑着导弹轰炸敌人阵地,实在太酷了,那是每个男 性的梦想。

8分钟前
  • 有心打扰
  • 推荐

Gentlemen, you can't fight in here! This is the War Room!

9分钟前
  • 浪味仙
  • 力荐

7.0 最好的政治讽刺剧没有之一。库布里克用这部氟化水一般的电影玷污了战争机器们最纯洁的体液。

12分钟前
  • 喂饭
  • 推荐

彼得塞勒斯和乔治斯科特都逗不过那个德州口音的机长 

16分钟前
  • 妖灵妖
  • 力荐

想想也是理所當然,如果一場核爆為男人帶來的不是恐懼而是破處似的快感,他們當然會從此開始大幹特幹呀……

20分钟前
  • 焚紙樓
  • 推荐

正经的喜剧,通篇的讽刺,疯子的忧伤,好看得丧心病狂。

23分钟前
  • 木卫二
  • 力荐

第一次接触库布里克的片子,倍受打击~~

25分钟前
  • 战国客
  • 还行

没看懂,好像有黑色幽默的地方在嘛就是觉得不好笑...科幻控可能会看懂?

26分钟前
  • 阿朽
  • 还行

三大场景:机舱、作战室、基地。过半场登场龙套男奇爱博士。骑氢弹的牛仔。向可口可乐公司要硬币的英国绅士。

29分钟前
  • 恶魔的步调
  • 力荐

Mein Führer, I can walk!

32分钟前
  • jazzkitty
  • 力荐

虽然是冷战的时代背景,但达摩克利斯之剑高悬于人类头顶的事实远没有改变。在漫长的最后一分钟营救中,展现官僚的无能、人性的罪恶、和某种奇异的幽默感,在世界还未毁灭时他们已经想着在新世界瓜分利益了(以人类之名),对俄国、英国、德国人都采取了典型化处理。极端的戏剧冲突展示深刻的当代现实。

36分钟前
  • xīn
  • 力荐

液体的纯洁

38分钟前
  • cao
  • 力荐

这个译名太囧了,看的好累中间还睡了,大脑都空白了。哦天

42分钟前
  • UrthónaD'Mors
  • 还行

给库爷跪了,不仅仅是起源的设想者,还是末日的预言者啊,他大概不是地球人。演博士的哥分饰三个角色,不仅让观众来劲,他自己也一定爽得要命吧

43分钟前
  • 米粒
  • 力荐

94/100 你知道把整个时代的恐惧和幻想如此直观的拍出来有多难吗?

48分钟前
  • SELVEN
  • 力荐

关注冷战史必看

52分钟前
  • 袁牧
  • 推荐

Dr. Strangelove比Dr. Strange更懂爱。

55分钟前
  • 朝暮雪
  • 推荐

库布里克从来不让人失望

56分钟前
  • 扭腰客
  • 力荐

你可以毁灭世界,但不许在作战室打架!这里是作战室!

58分钟前
  • 范克里夫大尉
  • 力荐